DISQUALIFICATION OF FEDERAL DISTRICT
JUDGES-PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS
INTRODUCTION

Few conceptions regarding the legal system of our nation are
more ingrained in the mind of the American public than the right to
a fair trial. While there may be much room for debate as to what
constitute the elements of a fair trial, it is beyond doubt that an impartial judge is an indispensable prerequisite. To ensure that this
right will be preserved, mechanisms have been developed for challenging judges in individual cases in which litigants doubt their impartiality. These procedures for disqualifying or recusing judges were
historically applicable only to certain narrow situations in which the
judge was personally interested in the result.1 However, more recent
legislation has greatly broadened the categories of conduct which require disqualification.
The federal statutes providing the means and standards for disqualification of judges are codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455.2
Under section 144, a party must file an affidavit certified by counsel
of record, moving that the judge be disqualified for personal prejudice or bias for or against one of the parties. 3 Although most com1 Traditionally, there has been a distinction between recusal and disqualification.
Compare recusation, BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1071 (3d ed. 1969) and BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1442 (4th ed. rev. 1968) with disqualify, id. at 558. In modern usage,
however, the terms recusation and recusal are seldom employed, and disqualification
appears almost exclusively. See Frank, Disqualification of Judges: II Support of the
Bayth Bill, 35 LAW & CONTENIP. PROB. 43, 45 & n.7 (1970). Thus, recusal will be used
in this Comment only when the age of the particular opinion or the language of a court
make it appropriate.
Originally, a judge's interest had to be either proprietary or pecuniary to warrant
disqualification. For discussions of the historical concept of disqualification see Frank,
sttpro, at 43-50; Symposium, Disqualificationof Judges for Prejudice or Bis--Common
Law Evolution, Current Status, and The Oregon Experieuce, 48 ORE. L. REV. 311,
315-32 (1969); Note, Disqualification of Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1435, 143.5--36 (1966).
2 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 455 (Supp. IV, 1975).
3 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970). This section provides:
Whenever a part\, to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a
timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending
has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse
party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be
assigned to hear such proceeding.
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mentators have observed that section 21, the predecessor statute to
section 144, intended the automatic disqualification of a judge upon
filing of a motion, judicial interpretation of section 21 established
that the challenged judge must first determine whether the allegations in the affidavit are legally sufficient to warrant disqualifica4
tion.
Section 455 provides the standards for judging the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, and also lists situations in which judges are
required to disqualify themselves sua sponte. 5 In April 1973, a new
Code of Judicial Conduct was adopted by the Judicial Conference of
the United States. 6 Canon 3C of the code contains more stringent
standards for disqualification of judges than had previously existed,
and in 1974 Congress reenacted section 455 to substantially incorporate them. 7 The new version of section 455 provides that the "judge

1(d.

The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or
prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning
of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be
shown for failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such
affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of
record stating that it is made in good faith.

4 The original intent behind the statute may be inferred from its language, Act of
March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 21, 36 Stat. 1090, and from the remarks by Representative
Cullop, sponsor of the bill, 46 CONG. REC. 2627 (1911). Since the decision in Berger v.
United States, 255 U.S. 22, 33-34, 36 (1921), it has been established, however, that
before the judge is disqualified, the determination must be made whether the affidavit
is legally sufficient to require disqualification. This interpretation of the statute was
apparently adopted by Congress when section 144 was enacted. See 28 U.S.C. § 144
(1970) (party must file a "sufficient affidavit"). For discussions of the congressional intent behind section 21 and its subsequent judicial interpretation see Schwartz, Disqualification for Bias in the Federal District Courts, 11 U. PITT. L. REV. 415, 424 (1950);
Note, Disqualification of a Federal District Judge for Bias-The Standard Under Section 144, 57 MINN. L. REv. 749, 753-54 (1973).
5 "Section 455 is the statutory standard for disqualification of a judge," and is
"self-enforcing" on his or her part. Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044,
1051 (5th Cir. 1975) (footnote omitted). Thus, the occurrence of one of the proscribed
circumstances may be the basis of a disqualification motion. In addition, the standards
enumerated in section 455 are the background against which appellate coucts must determine whether a judge's refusal to step aside was incorrect. See id. For the text of
section 455 see note 7 infra.
6 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES,

Canon 3C; see H.R.

REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5 (1974).
' 28 U.S.C. § 455 (Supp. IV, 1975). The following portions of amended section 455
are pertinent to the material discussed in this Comment:
(a) Any justice, judge, magistrate, or referee in bankruptcy of the United
States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
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• . . shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned 8 as well as in those cases where a
listed condition is found to exist. 9 The goal of the framers of this
statute was
to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process by saying, in effect, if there is a reasonable factual basis for
doubting the judge's impartiality, he should disqualify himself and
let another judge preside over the case. '0

Clearly, to effect the goal of securing fair trials in federal courts
these statutes must work for those attempting to use them, while at
the same time protecting the court system from abuse by those
merely seeking to cause delay or harassment. It is the purpose of this
Comment to discuss the inadequacies of the currently available federal disqualification mechanisms. After a survey of the problems at
the trial level, the focus will be on the means available for appellate
review of a trial judge's refusal to step aside, and why these seldom
succeed. The author will then discuss various approaches for improving the federal disqualification process with the intention of showing
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during
such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such
lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such
capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the
proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular
case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or
minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest
that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or
trustee of a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness
in the proceeding.
8 Id. § (a) (emphasis added).
9 Id. § (b). This disqualification is required by law should one of the conditions be
present and involves no discretion on the judge's part.
10 H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974) (emphasis added). The implication is that the judge must only reasonably appear to the movant to be biased.
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that "depersonalization" of procedures is desirable. To achieve increased objectivity, a comprehensive approach will be proposed,
incorporating currently existing disqualification methods and other
suggested reforms. The goal will be to propound an effective combination of remedies from the trial level through the appellate courts,
so that the litigant who suspects bias may have this apprehension
reviewed impartially regardless of when it arises.
PROBLEMS AT THE TRIAL LEVEL

That there are many undesirable features of the current federal
disqualification procedure in the district courts is illustrated by the
fact that, although the filing of disqualification motions is not uncommon, success is rare. 1 1 The movant's inability to obtain relief is due
to several factors: narrow statutory interpretation by judges; the requirement in many courts that actual bias, and not merely an appearance of bias, be alleged; and the fact that the challenged judge rules
on the sufficiency of the affidavit.12
11For example, in one case the judge stated that "a successful disqualification motion has been . . . an unusual and extraordinary occurrence." Duplan Corp. v. Deering
,Milliken, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 497, 513 (D.S.C. 1975). See Note, Mitchell v. Sirica: The
Appearance of Justice, Recusal, and the Highly Publicized Trial, 61 VA. L. REV. 236,
251 (1975).
12 See Note, supra note 11, at 247-52. A rigid construction of the personal bias requirement is unsound as a general rule, id. at 247, since it eliminates the possibility of
disqualifying the judge in many instances where there is a strong impression that he
will not be impartial. However, judges typically refuse to disqualify themselves because
they interpret the type of prejudice alleged as insufficient. See, e.g., Eisler v, United
States, 170 F.2d 273, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. dismissed, 338 U.S. 883 (1949) ("impersonal prejudice resulting from a judge's background or experience is not . . . within the
purview of the statute," even though in this prosecution of a Communist alien for contempt of Congress the judge had been an anti-Communist investigator for the FBI and
was a long-time friend of the FBI director, an allegedly ardent anti-Communist); Craven
v. United States, 22 F.2d 605, 607-08 (lst Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 276 U.S. 627 (1928)
(strong views expressed by judge that requirement of bias alleged must have an extrajudicial source, as well as specific argument in favor of a narrow interpretation of the
statute); cf. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 43 (1921) (McReynolds, J., dissenting)
(an "[i]ntense dislike of a class" of which movant is a member should not be a basis for
disqualifying the judge).
Construction of the grounds in section 455 under which disqualification is mandatory and which, on their face, do not seem open to conflicting interpretation, has diminished the likelihood of obtaining a new judge on these grounds. Thus, it has been
held that the only "of counsel" relationship between the judge and a party which will
demand the judge's disqualification is when the judge was of counsel in the specific
case at bar. United States v. Vasilick, 160 F.2d 631, 632 (3d Cir. 1947); see Carr v. Fife,
156 U.S. 494, 498 (1895). The "substantial interest" ground tinder section 455 has been
stated to pertain only to a "direct pecuniary stake in the outcome." See Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARV. L. REV. 736, 740
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To disqualify a judge under section 144, an affidavit must be
"timely and sufficient." '13 Although the timeliness requirement proves
to be a substantial handicap to many movants, 1 4 the sufficiency requirement presents an even greater problem. The only guidance afforded by the statute in determining whether or not allegations are
sufficient is5 the specification that the bias or prejudice must be
"personal.'
Judicial construction of this standard has often been so
narrow that only a personal enmity against the actual movant will
suffice.' 6 As a result, it has been suggested that bias against a party's
attorney' 7 or against a class of which the party is a member 1 8 may be
an insufficient ground for disqualification. Yet these are types of bias
which, depending upon the degree, may become equally pernicious
and be transferred to the litigant.19
(1973). It is important to note that these constructions were expressed prior to the
amendment of section 455 in 1974. The new version more specifically defines these
terms and will hopefully result in less narrow interpretations. For a discussion of the
amended section 455 see notes 46-51 infra and accompanying text.
:3 See text of section 144 reprinted at note 3 supra.
14 Section 144 provides no guidance as to what is timely; it merely provides that the
filing of the motion be "not less than ten days before the beginning of the term at
which the proceeding is to be heard." 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970). This requirement is no
longer applicable, however, due to the abolishment of formal terms for district courts.
28 U.S.C. § 138 (1970). Courts tend to construe very narrowly what constitutes "timely"
filing and what is "good cause" for failure to do so. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 497, 509-10 (D.S.C. 1975). In Samuel v. University of
Pittsburgh, 395 F. Supp. 1275, 1279 (W.D. Pa. 1975), the judge stated that
the affidavit will be considered untimely if the affiant, after knowledge of the
facts showing the supposed bias, has sought to invoke the court's affirmative
action in his behalf before filing the affidavit.
15 See text of section 144 reprinted in note 3 supra.
16 See, e.g., Henry v. Speer, 201 F. 869, 871-72 (5th Cir. 1913); Duplan Corp. v.
Deering Milliken, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 497, 513-14 (D.S.C. 1975).
17 See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 497, 522-23
(D.S.C. 1975). Judge Hemphill stated that
[i]t is only when the judge's "antipathy has crystalized to a point where the
attorney can do no right" that he no longer will he able to impartially try the
case.

Id. at 523 (footnote omitted) (quoting from Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794, 798 (2d
Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.)). This point of view fails to take note of the fact that a strong
emotion which has not reached this degree might well have a subconscious effect on
the judge's feelings toward the client. Cf. Forer, Psychiatric Evidence in the Recusation
of Judges, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1325, 1330 (1960).
18 Note, supra note 1, at 1449-50. In arguing against this approach, the author
pointed out that "'general bias is likely to be transferred to the individual and thus
become personal." Id. at 1450. This point of view was also implicdly recognized in
Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 28-30, 36 (1921), when the Supreme Court held
sufficient an affidavit alleging bias against defendants based on general anti-German
expressions made by the judge.
19 In discussing whether bias against "a class of persons of which the party is a
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Another problem that can be seen at the trial level is that, instead of confining themselves to a consideration of whether the legal
sufficiency standard is met and thereby addressing the true question
in the case, many judges quibble over the source and nature of the
bias. Thus, in most instances a bias must have developed from an
extrajudicial source, rather than from any proceedings in the present
case. 20 In addition, many courts will not recognize a litigant's allegations of bias if manifested solely by the rulings and behavior of the
judge during the trial. 2 ' As a result, what might be interpreted as
clear overreaction by a district court judge during pretrial proceedings has been held not to require disqualification on the ground that
it was "judicial" conduct. 2 2 Moreover, prejudgment on the merits,
member" ought to be a basis for disqualification, one author has suggested basically a
case-by-case approach which would consider "the vehemence of the expression of bias
toward the class . . . [and] the subject matter of the expression" as indicative of
"whether the statements or activities would . . . give rise to a personal bias against a
party in court who is a member of that class." Note, supra note 12, at 756; see Note,
supra note 1, at 1450.
20 See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 580-83 (1966) (disqualifying bias requires "extrajudicial source" causing "opinion on the merits on some basis
other than . . . participation in the case") (citation omitted); United States v. Franks,
511 F.2d 25, 37 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042, 1048 (1975) (distinguishing between judicial and personal bias); United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478, 485 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975) ("An allegation of 'judicial' bias is not grounds
for a motion to recuse"); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 503 F.2d 68, 81
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975) (statements made by judge in newspaper interview and based on findings in prior phase of case found not grounds for
disqualification); Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 101 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1119 (1969) ("to constitute disqualifying personal bias or prejudice" statements
must arise other than "from proceedings had before the court"). See also Duplan Corp.
v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 497, 511-12 (D.S.C. 1975).
21 See, e.g., Curl v. IBM, 517 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 1975) (only allegations "related
. . . to the judge's conduct of the case"); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Pentronix, Inc., 403 F.
Supp. 367, 373 (E.D. Pa. 1975) ("§ i44 was . . . [not] a substitute for an appeal ... [of] adverse rulings or decisions"); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 497,
514-15, 517 (D.S.C. 1975) ("facts . . . establishing the alleged bias and prejudice of the
trial judge must be based on something other than rulings in the particular case"; "'adverse rulings in previous proceedings . . . are insufficient").
22 Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 537-44 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976

(1972). The affidavit charged Judge Lord with various prejudicial actions, including refusal to approve settlements and urging the creation of a new class of litigants to further
sue defendants. Id. at 536, 540. The court of appeals, on a mandamus petition, rejected
all the charges as being insufficient to require disqualification, even though the court
chastised Judge Lord for "his shortcomings in this case" and commended to him "the
Socratic definition of the four qualities required of every judge: to hear courteously; to
answer wisely; to consider soberly; and to decide impartially." Id. at 543-44.
Clearly, even if the court did not feel that Judge Lord was biased, it would have
been best to remove him from the case to maintain the appearance of justice. For a
discussion of this case see Note, supra note 4, at 760-63.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7: 612

based upon exposure to related cases or manifested by out-of-court
statements of the judge, has also been held legally insufficient. 23
A particular source of confusion is whether the affidavit must allege facts which indicate actual bias on the judge's part, or which
merely reflect a reasonable appearance of bias. Under an appearanceof-bias standard, a finding of legal sufficiency is merely an indication
that something the judge has done reasonably gives the impression
that bias exists; it is not an actual finding that the judge is biased. 24
Yet most courts do require that the affidavit sufficiently allege actual
bias on the judge's part. 25 In view of the highly subjective nature of
bias, it is extremely difficult to show facts indicating actual bias, since
litigants rarely have sufficient acquaintance with a judge's private life
to have such information. 26 In addition, even where actual bias does
not exist, a litigant's real apprehension of judicial bias may have a
deleterious effect on a trial. 27 Thus, while it may be argued that it is
necessary only that the judge actually be impartial, it is important to
recognize that the proper functioning of the court system requires
that the judge also appear to be impartial. 28
2 Compare Henry v. Speer, 201 F. 869, 872 (5th Cir. 1913), and Note, supra note 1,
at 1448, with United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966), and Curl v. IBM, 517
F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 1975), and Note, supra note 12, at 751, 757-58.
24 Note, supra note 4, at 767. Under a proper application of section 144 the finding
does not really indicate actual bias since the allegations may not be disputed. However,
where the bias-in-fact standard is applied, courts do feel that "a finding of actual prejudice under the bias in fact standard impugns both that judge's qualifications and those
of the system he represents." Id. (emphasis in original).
25
See, e.g., Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs of Alabama State Bar, 524 F.2d 98, 100 (5th
Cir. 1975). But see id. at 104 (Brown, C.J., concurring); id. at 106 (Gee, J., concurring);
id. at 107-09 (Tuttle, J., dissenting).
Some courts have reasoned that if the judge is not "actually prejudiced," but merely
appears prejudiced, his presiding over the trial will not adversely affect the litigants'
interests. As a result, they allow disqualification only where bias in fact is shown. Note,
supra note 4, at 758-59 & n.59.
26 Comment, Disqualifying Federal District Judges Without Cause, 50 WASH. L.
REV. 109, 126-27 (1974). It would be difficult for the majority of litigants to evaluate the
possibility that the judge is actually biased. In addition, the bias-in-fact standard requires "subjective speculation as to the source and nature of a judge's prejudice and
mental state." Note, supra note 4, at 764.
27 A good example of this problem is provided by the recent Watergate trials in
which the impartiality of Judge Sirica was questioned. Although there were many other
reasons for the fear on the part of the Watergate defendants that they could not obtain a
fair trial, the conduct of the case by Judge Sirica was itself a focus of attention by the
defendants and the public. For a specific discussion of the disqualification question in
this instance see Note, supra note 11.
28See, e.g., id. at 250. That author suggested that
[jiust as litigants have a right to a fair trial, the public requires a judicial system
that maintains the appearance of fairness. Indeed, the appearance of justice may
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Perhaps the greatest problem, and the source of much judicial
recalcitrance in dealing with disqualification affidavits, is the fact that
it is generally the challenged judge who rules on the motion. 2 9 The
judge may decide only whether the facts alleged are legally sufficient
on their face to require disqualification, not whether they are actually
true. 30 Because judges must rule on these motions without exercising
their fact-finding function and without rebutting the allegations
made-even where the statements are blatantly distortive of the
truth-it is not surprising that emotional responses often result.
Sometimes the mere filing of a disqualification motion precipitates an extraordinarily nonjudicial response on the part of judges,
well be even more important in the long run than the fact of impartiality.
Courts depend for their power almost entirely on the perceived legitimacy of
their activities.
Id. (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). In the leading federal case on recusal,
Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921), the Court suggested such an approach by
indicating that courts must "give assurance that they are impartial." Id. at 36. For additional discussions of this question see Schwartz, supra note 4, at 422; Note, supra note
4, at 765.
A general concern that court proceedings appear fair may be indicated by the failure of Judge Haynsworth's nomination to the Supreme Court to be confirmed by Congress. His defeat in the Senate was apparently made possible by "the swing votes" of
those senators who did not otherwise oppose him, but "who were troubled by the conflict of interest questions' raised by his failure in several cases to disclose minor
shareholdings in corporations which were litigants in his court. Comment, supra note
26, at 117 & n.40.
29 One of the principal problems with this system is that
[t]his procedure by its very nature undermines the appearance of justice. In
short, judges rarely disqualify themselves for bias or prejudice. And while a
judge's decision not to disqualify himself may be completely justified, it may
not appear so.
Note, .supra note 11, at 251 (footnotes omitted); accord, Schwartz, supra note 4, at 429.
But (f. Craven v. United States, 22 F.2d 605, 607 (1st Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 276 U.S.
627 (1928), wherein it was said that '[t]he presiding judge, under a fitting and common
practice, referred the sufficiency of [the] affidavit to another District Judge."
3o In Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 32-34 (1921), the Supreme Court indicated that "the affidavit . .. nust give fair support to the charge of a bent of mind that
may prevent or impede impartiality of judgment.' While this interpretation may conflict
with the original notion that the filing of a motion and affidavit resulted in a peremptory
recusation of the judge, such a position is sound since an affidavit containing nothing
"more than scurrilities and generalities" should not be an adequate basis for disqualification. Griffith v. Edwards, 493 F.2d 495, 496 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 861
(1974). Otherwise, a mere statement that "The judge does not like me" would warrant
disqualification even though no reasons for the charge were given. While it is debatable
whether section 21 of the Judicial Code of 1911 (Ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1090, adding § 21 to
the Judicial Code), the provision considered in Berger, was intended to require a decision of legal sufficiency, Congress did ratify that interpretation in enacting the Revised
Code of 1948 which required the filing of a "timely and sufficient affidavit." Act of June
25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 898 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970)). See Schwartz, supra
note 4, at 425.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7: 612

who may regard the affidavit as an attack on their general competence
and as an attempt to deprive them of their "right" to hear the particular case. 3 ' As a result, some judges ignore the mandate of Berger v.
United States that they not look to the truth of the allegations.3 2 Instead, they attempt to place their remarks or acts into context before
judging their legal sufficiency, 33 or hold hearings on the question of
disqualification. 3 4 The judicial hostility often caused by the filing of
the motion thus hinders its impartial disposition. And, if the motion
is denied, the ensuing trial may also be afflicted with an emotional
atmosphere. Thus, the continued hostility of the judge, subconscious
or otherwise, due to the fact and nature of the challenge, may be
pitted against the continuing belief on the part of the movant, possi35
bly enhanced by denial of the motion, that the judge is biased.
Although it does seem unfair to disqualify a judge who knows the
allegations filed to be a sham, this overlooks a much more important
consideration: It is not the judge who is on trial, nor does a judge
have any legal right or interest in hearing a particular case. 36 Instead,
the focus should be on the timing of the motion and the complexity of
the case. Whether the motion is filed prior to trial and prior to the

31 See United States v. Parker, 23 F. Supp. 880, 882-83 (D.N.J. 1938), aff'd, 103 F.2d
857 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 642 (1939), wherein the judge stated that by
not allowing a judge to delve into the truth of the allegations, the system deprived him
or her of a " 'day in court.' "' In commenting on this view, one author has noted, however, that
while a litigant is entitled to a "day in court" so that he will have a chance to
establish the rights he is asserting or which are being challenged, a judge has
no such right or interest in trying a particular case, and it is therefore misleading to speak of his right to a "day in court" in this context.
Note, supra note 1, at 1437.
32 255 U.S. 22, 36 (1921).
33See, e.g., Foster v. Medina, 170 F.2d 632, 633-34 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 909 (1949); Lazofsky v. Sommerset Bus Co., 389 F. Supp. 1041, 1043-44 (E.D.N.Y.
1975).
34
See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 497, 503-04
(D.S.C. 1975) (hearings and extended opinion); (f. Note, supra note 1, at 1437 (discussion of state use of disqualification hearings and why these are undesirable).
35 Note, supra note 1,at 1439. The observation was made by that author
that the damage resulting from a trial conducted by a biased judge who is later
disqualified goes deeper than the wasted time and effort . .. and that even if
the judge is later upheld in declaring the affidavit insufficient, the fact that the
issue was still open may have had a harmful effect on the trial.
Id. at 1440 (footnote omitted). Accord, Comment, supro note 26, at 126.
36 See 255 U.S. at 35, wherein Justice McKenna queried:
[O]f what concern is it to a judge to preside in a particular case; of what concern to other parties to have him so preside?
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decision of other motions, 37 in the middle of a case, 38 after judgment, 39 or before retrial after a mistrial or remand by an appellate
court, 40 has great bearing on whether disqualification should be readily granted, or whether the degree of bias is outweighed by any advantages gained by keeping the same judge. In the early stages of a
proceeding, disqualification should be little more than an administrative matter, since there is at that point no legitimate reason for the
opposing party to dispute the motion. 4 1 As the proceedings progress,
countervailing considerations do arise. In complex cases embracing
matters such as patents and antitrust 42 or school desegregation, 4 3
which are likely to last many months or even years, the need to avoid
relitigation due to reversal is much greater than in short, uncomplicated disputes. 4 4 Yet it may be in those complex cases that retention
of the same judge is most imperative, since even prior to trial the
judge may have absorbed much information which it would take a
new judge months to review. 45 In these situations, it might not be
unreasonable to require more stringent procedures, and possibly even
a higher standard of bias, than in less complicated cases or those in
V E.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 400 F. Stipp. 497, 502-04 (D.S.C.
1975).
38 E.g., Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 395 F. Supp. 1275, 1280 (W.D. Pa. 1975),
).%herein the court stated that "the motion appears to be a classic instance of a lawyer's
attempt to mitigate his 'fear that a judge may decide a question against him.' "
3' E.g., Kent v. Northern Cal. Regional Office of Am. Friends Serv. Comm., 497
F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir. 1974).
4
0 E.g., Lazofsky v. Sommerset Bus Co., 389 F. Supp. 1041, 1042 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). In
view of the fact that this was not an extremely complex case (personal injury suit arising
out of an automobile/bus collision), it seems unreasonable not to have transferred the
case to another judge. This is especially true since the first trial ended in a mistrial
when the plaintiff's lawyer broke down during the trial because of the particular poignancy of his client's situation. Id. at 1042, 1043-44.
41 Although it is common knowledge that attorneys often prefer one judge over
another for a particular type of suit, there is no legal right to have a specific judge try
any given case. United States v. Devlin, 284 F. Supp. 477, 482 (D. Conn. 1968).
42E.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976
(1972); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 497 (D.S.C. 1975).
41 E.g., Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
929 (1975).
44Cf. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 537, 542-43 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 976 (1972), wherein the court noted the position taken by respondent, United
States, that due to " 'the complexity, number and probable duration of the cases involved,' " mandamus was an appropriate remedy when the judge refused to disqualify
himself.
45 See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 542 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976
(1972); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 497, 502 (D.S.C. 1975).
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which a significant portion of the proceedings has not yet occurred.
Although the ostensible incorporation of the appearance-of-bias
test into the new section 455(a)46 should help to alleviate some of the
difficulties discussed above, the few cases decided under this general
ground for disqualification indicate that the purpose of the statute
continues to be circumvented. For example, the determination
whether the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned is
still to be decided by the challenged judge. 47 Furthermore, while the
specifically expressed intention of Congress is to eliminate the dutyto-sit concept, 4 8 i.e., the notion that in a close case the judge must
resolve the question in favor of not stepping aside, some courts still
rely upon that rationale. 4 9 Perhaps this is due to judicial reliance on
case law interpreting the prior statutes, without truly differentiating
the language or intent of the new statute. 50 For whatever reason,
judges are very quick to emphasize that
the language of § 455(a) that disqualification is called for "in any
proceeding in which [the judge's] impartiality might reasonably be
"See Note, supra note 12, at 745. Although the author's discussion refers to the
new Code of Judicial Conduct, it is equally applicable to the new version of section
455, since the two are virtually identical. Compare H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 3-5 (1974), with 28 U.S.C. § 455 (Supp. IV, 1975).
47 28 U.S.C. § 455 (Supp. IV, 1975).
48 "The language [of section 455(a)] also has the effect of removing the so-called
'duty to sit' which has become a gloss on the existing statute." H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974).
49 See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 497, 526-27
(D.S.C. 1975); Lazofsky v. Sommerset Bus Co., 389 F. Supp. 1041, 1045 (E.D.N.Y.
1975). The judge in Lazofsky, however, certified the issue for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970), specifically so that the intended modification of
"the 'duty-to-sit' concept" could be interpreted by a higher court. Judge Platt was of the
opinion that this issue met the requirements of section 1292(b) for certification of an
interlocutory appeal. See notes 68-77 infra and accompanying text.
50 In Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1975), referring to various cases which it had cited, the court said:
We find no suggestion in the legislative history that these decisions were
being overruled or in anywise eroded. The new language was designed to substitute the reasonable factual basis-reasonable man test in determining disqualification for the subjective "in the opinion of the judge" test in use prior to
the amendment. . . . It was also intended to overrule the so-called duty to sit
decisions.... The abuse of sound judicial discretion test continues to obtain on
appellate review.
(Citations omitted.) In view of the fact that judges are likely to consider themselves
reasonable people, this interpretation of the statute virtually amounts to the same standard as before.
In Lazofsky v. Sommerset Bus Co., 389 F. Supp. 1041, 1044-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), the
judge stated that he must rely on "the consistent rulings of the Supreme Court ... over
the years," thereby refusing to give effect to the obvious intent of Congress in enacting
section 455(a) that there be an appearance of justice.
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questioned," does not amount to a grant of automatic veto power in
order that counsel might choose a judge who meets with their
approval. 51

From this discussion it should be clear that current disqualification mechanisms at the trial level are essentially ineffectual. 52 Even
though the present system may protect the courts from being imposed upon by litigants whose affidavits are blatantly dilatory or distortive of the real facts, the system is damaged in the end when sincere and genuinely concerned movants are unable to convince a
judge to step aside. The next section will address the efficacy of the
remedies available to such a party at the appellate level.
PROBLEMS IN THE APPELLATE COURTS

There are three principal methods by which unsuccessful disqualification motions may be brought to the attention of a higher authority: appeal from a final judgment, interlocutory appeal, or petition for
a writ of mandamus or prohibition. Appellate courts are in general
accord that denial of such a motion may be assigned as error on 53a
final appeal, but that it is not in itself a final, appealable order.
However, courts of appeals differ widely as to whether the appropriate means of interlocutory review should be by appeal or by extraordinary writ.
The basic policy behind the final judgment rule is to prevent
piecemeal appeals of different rulings in a case, essentially to avoid
crowding court calendars and delaying the ultimate termination of
litigation. 54 In many instances this premise is well justified, since
many erroneous rulings, such as those on evidentiary questions, may
51 Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 395 F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (W.D. Pa. 1975); cf.
Lazofsky v. Sommerset Bus Co., 389 F. Supp. 1041, 1044 (E.D.N.Y.1975).
52 For example, it has been said that

[a]ttorneys who appear in federal district court are virtually powerless to
remove a judge from a particular case when they personally believe, rightly or
wrongly, that justice will not be done by that individual judge.
Comment, supra note 26, at 109.
5 See, e.g., Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591, 594 (3d Cir. 1958); Collier v. Picard,
237 F.2d 234, 235 (6th Cir. 1956) (per curiam); Skirvin v. Mesta, 141 F.2d 668, 671 (10th
Cir. 1944); 9 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 110.13[101, at 187 (2d ed. 1975). Denial of
disqualification may also be reviewed on the appeal of another interlocutory order
which is itself appealable. Skirvin v. Mesta, supra at 671; J. MOORE, supra 110.13[10],
at 187. Contra, General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 331 F.2d 192, 198 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 952 (1964).
54Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARV. L. REv. 351, 351-52 (1961);
see Note, supra note 1, at 1440 (the author stated that most federal courts do not feel
that disqualification cases should be an exception to this policy).
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be held harmless error in the midst of an otherwise sound trial. 55
Furthermore, with the possible exception of situations such as contempt of court, trial judges generally are not ruling on issues which
may be viewed as personal to them. 5 6 Disqualification motions, however, present a totally different picture. The personal involvement of
the judge in these rulings makes the usual judicial detachment difficult to achieve. In addition, in any case in which an appellate court
later declares disqualification to have been warranted, the entire trial
which occurred under the aegis of the challenged judge will have
been a nullity. 5 7 As a result, application of the final judgment rule in
such cases creates "the spectacle of a labor saving device which
causes more labor than it saves." 5 8 Since the issue of disqualification
is separate from the merits of the case and involves purely a question
of law, 59 there appears to be no other reason for postponing its review.
55Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-24 (1967) (even "federal constitutional
errors" not basis for reversal of criminal conviction when their "likelihood of having
changed the result" is minimal); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86 (1963) ("question
is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have
contributed to the conviction"); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 762-65 (1946)
(the error must have had "substantial influence" on the verdict to -warrant reversal);
Prater v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 372 F.2d 447, 448 (6th Cir. 1967) (per curiam) (reversal
only where error will cause denial of "substantial justice"). See generally 11 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2883, at 275-80 (1973).
56FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b) requires the disqualification of a judge from hearing a
criminal contempt charge against a defendant in cases wherein the basis of the charge is
"disrespect to or criticism of" that judge.
57See Mims v. Shapp, No. 75-2174 at 3 (3d Cir., Sept. 1, 1976). Another authority is of
the opinion that
[t]here should be no room in this context for the concept of harmless error ...
nor for arguments to be made that in fact the judge acted in an impartial manner. . . . Failure of a judge to step aside if he is disqualified under one of the
...statutes always should require reversal.
13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3553,
at 385 (1975) (footnote omitted). However, if the party moving for disqualification subsequently wins the case, no harm has been done even if the judge was biased. Thus,
courts correctly reverse in such a case only where the verdict has been adverse to the
party against whom the judge is biased. E.g., Knapp v. Kinsey, 232 F.2d 458 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 892 (1956); Whitaker v. McLean, 118 F.2d 596 (D.C. Cir. 1941)
(per curiam) (the court reversed because there had been an appearance of bias, even
though the judges felt that the plaintiff's claim probably lacked merit); cf. Gulf Research & Dev. Co. v. Leahy, 193 F.2d 302, 304-05 (3d Cir. 1951), aff'd by (n equally
divided Court, 344 U.S. 861 (1952) (while concluding remedy by final appeal adequate
regarding venue questions, the court indicated that an erroneous transfer order did invalidate the whole trial which followed).
58 Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 558 (1932).
5 See Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 36 (1921). Since the Court held that the
challenged judge may not pass on the truth of the allegations, the only decision left
-sufficiency of the affidavit-was a legal one. But see Korer v. Hoffman, 212 F.2d 211,
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The remedy of appeal after a final judgment proves to be inadequate for other reasons as well. Because of the inherent value of an
impartial judge in our legal system, it is imperative that the "charge
of partiality in the administration of justice . . . initiated by a formal
affidavit of prejudice against a judge . .. receive final adjudication" as
soon as possible. 60 Since, as has already been discussed, a trial before
an unsuccessfully challenged judge may well proceed in an atmosphere of tension, "[o]nly a final ruling on the matter by a disinterested higher court before trial can dispel this unwholesome
aura. "61

These objections to waiting for a final judgment before appealing
the denial of a disqualification motion are buttressed by the fact that
few final appeals are successful. Applying the same criteria used by
trial courts to defeat these motions, courts of appeals generally require that bias in fact, and not merely an appearance of bias, be
shown, 62 and that the source of the bias be extrajudicial, not acquired
through the proceedings in the case.63 Use of these standards permits
the ready conclusion by appellate courts that the allegations in most
affidavits are insufficient. This result is further facilitated when the
trial judge's alleged remarks and actions are put into context through
appellate review of the record or of the extrajudicial situations in
which they were made. 6 4 Although a trial judge who places the allegations into context is violating the command of section 144,65 such
action by the appellate court may be justified, since the question on
final appeal is whether the person actually received a fair trial. 66 How213 (7th Cir. 1954) (although acknowledging that the sufficiency of the affidavit is a
legal question, the court concluded that for that very reason it should wait for final
appeal).
60 Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591, 595 (3d Cir. 1958) (Hastie, J., concurring); In re
Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 384 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961).
61 Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591, 595 (3d Cir. 1958) (Hastie, J., concurring).
62 E.g., Craven v. United States, 22 F.2d 605, 608 (1st Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 276
U.S. 627 (1928). But see Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 35-36 (1921).
63 Oliver v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 180 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
963 (1975); Craven v. United States, 22 F.2d 605, 607-08 (1st Cir. 1927), cert. denied,
276 U.S. 627 (1928).
64 See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 42-43 (1921) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) (final appeal); Wolfson v. Palnieri, 396 F.2d 121, 125 (2d Cir. 1968) (manclamus); Cuddy v. Otis, 33 F.2d 577, 578 (8th Cir. 1929) (mandamus).
65
See note 3 supra. This has been the rule since Berger v. United States, 255 U.S.
22 (1921), the leading case on recusal, which established that the predecessor statute to
section 144 (lid not allow the judge to determine the truth or falsity of the allegations.
255 U.S. at 36.
66 Under the federal harmless error statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1970), judgment on
appeal is to be made "after an examination of the record without regard to errors or
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ever, certain manifestations of unfairness which exist in a trial before a
biased judge or a judge irritated by the movant's challenge to his or
her impartiality are elusive of such appellate review, since they may
consist of a tone of voice, mannerisms or facial expressions, which are
not preserved by the record. 6 7 Finally, a reluctance by appellate
judges to find partiality in one of their colleagues at the trial level may
be compounded by the predilection to let a final decision stand whenever possible. For these reasons, litigants have sought, and some
appellate courts have attempted to provide, methods for reviewing
unsuccessful disqualification motions at an earlier stage in the proceedings.
Finding a means of securing interlocutory review when disqualification is refused is not an easy task, even though interlocutory appeals are specifically provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1292.68 Prior to
1958, the statute allowed such appeals only in cases involving injunctions, receivership, admiralty, and patents. 6 9 In that year subsection
(b) was added to allow the interlocutory appeal of other orders, provided the district judge certifies that they
involv[e] a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal
from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation ....70

If the judge does certify the ruling for immediate appeal, it is then
within the absolute discretion of the court of appeals to decide
whether or not it will hear the case. A refusal to take the appeal may
defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." (Emphasis added.) See
FED. R. Civ. P. 61; FED. R. CaiM. P. 5 (a); Ex parte Glasgow, 195 F. 780, 782 (N.D. Ga.
1912).
Where the error alleged is a wrongful denial of a disqualification motion, the court
of appeals ought not to overturn a judgment based on a spurious affidavit of bias. See,
e.g., United States v. Trevithick, 526 F.2d 838, 839 n.1 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96
S. Ct. 1475 (1976). However, under an appearance-of-bias standard all that should be
necessary is that the facts alleged in the affidavit and the context in which they were
made could reasonably have created a belief that the judge was biased. See United States
v. Amerine, 411 F.2d 1130 (6th Cir. 1969). In that case, even though the Sixth Circuit felt
that the defendant had actually received a fair and impartial trial, it vacated the judgment since the judge had been the United States Attorney when the original complaint
was filed and preliminary hearing took place. Id. at 1133.
67 In Gladstein v. McLaughlin, 230 F.2d 762, 763 (9th Cir. 1955), the court stated
that on final appeal it would have to "consider the record made up by a judge we know
to be prejudiced and which well could be infected with his prejudice."
6828 U.S.C. § 1292 (1970).
69Act of Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, § 49, 65 Stat. 726-27.
70Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-919, 72 Stat. 1770.
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be based on any reason whatsoever, including an overcrowded calendar, and no explanation of this decision need be given. In addition,
the proceedings below are not automatically stayed by the filing of an
appeal under section 1292(b). The trial proceedings will be halted
pending the outcome of the appeal only when this is specifically ordered by either a district or appellate judge. 72 These three requirements-certification by the district judge, discretion as to acceptance
of the appeal by the court of appeals, and continuation of the trial
absent an order to the contrary-are viewed as safeguards against
73
abuse of the procedure.
For the unsuccessful movant, however, these safeguards may be
formidable obstacles. Persuading the judge that certification is warranted may be a difficult chore. First, it may be debated whether the
disqualification of a judge is a "controlling question of law." The observation has been made that this requirement may be met if a wrong
ruling on the motion would require reversal of the judgment. 74 On
the other hand, it has been conjectured that a question may not be
controlling unless it is related to the merits of the controversy. 7 ' Second, the judge who must be persuaded to certify the question is the
76
very judge who has been challenged and has denied the motion.
The stronger the judge's conviction that the affidavit is insufficient,
the less likely it is that he or she will find the "substantial ground for
difference of opinion" required by the statute for certification. 7 7 Even
if the motion is certified, however, the purpose of the interlocutory
appeal will be defeated if the proceedings are not also stayed, as the
premise upon which such an appeal is sought is that a trial before the
particular judge will not be just.
Since the interlocutory remedy provided by section 1292(b) is so
cumbersome, many movants attempt to secure prompt relief by initiating a petition for mandamus or prohibition. While the propriety
of using mandamus 78 to compel a judge's disqualification may be
71 S. REP.

No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958).
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970); Note, supra note 54, at 378.
73 See S. REP. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1958); Note, supra note 54, at
378-79.
74 Note, supra note 54, at 379.
75 Note, supra note 1, at 1441.
76
1d.
77 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970). In Freed v. Inland Empire Ins. Co., 174 F. Supp. 458,
465 (D. Utah 1959), the judge stated that he
would hardly be in a position to certify that there was any real question concerning the insufficiency of the showing made . . . on the question of disqualification, believing that there is not.
78 In the disqualification context, writs of mandamus and prohibition have the same
72 28
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questioned on historical grounds, 79 eight of the eleven circuits coneffect: Mandamus would direct the judge to step aside, whereas prohibition would
order the judge to proceed no further. Compare mandamus, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1113 (4th ed. rev. 1968), with prohibition, id. at 1377. As a result, further discussion of
these writs in this Comment will refer only to mandamus.
79 Traditionally, writs of mandamus have been issued by superior courts to inferior
courts to compel them to perform a legitimate duty which they are delaying or refusing
to perform. J. HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES, §§ 150-51 (1874) [hereinafter
cited as HIGH]; see Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943). Moreover,
it had generally been held
that in all matters resting within the jurisdiction of an inferior court, and upon
which it [had] acted in a judicial capacity, mandamus [would] not lie to review
its proceedings, or to revise its rulings ....
HIGH, supra § 150. This principle has been expressed as leaving unreviewed, except by
appeal from a final judgment, any matter legitimately within a lower court's power and
discretion to decide. Id. § 156. Thus, if a court had discretion to act, "[tihe most that
[could] be urged is that the order was . .. an abuse of discretion," reviewable on final
appeal, not by mandamus. United States v. Bondy, 171 F.2d 642, 644 (2d Cir. 1948) (per
curiam); accord, La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 261 (1957) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Green v. Murphy, 259 F.2d 591, 593-94 (3d Cir. 1958); Howes Leather Co.
v. La Buy, 226 F.2d 703, 712 (7th Cir. 1955) (Major, J., dissenting), aff'd, 352 U.S. 249
(1957); Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REv. 751,
773-74 (1957). The reasoning behind the rule is that the remedy on appeal will be
sufficient to correct any errors made, and that mandamus is not a substitute for appeal.
Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 97 (1967); Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 520-21
(1956); Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947); HIGH, supra §§ 188-89.
Thus, in the disqualification context, it is arguable that mandamus, as traditionally
defined, would not be an appropriate device to review the trial judge's denial of the
motion. Passing on a disqualification motion is a legitimate judicial function of the trial
judge. Green v. Murphy, supra at 593. As a result, even a wrong decision would be no
more than an error as to a matter within the judge's jurisdiction, which arguably should
await final appeal. Id. at 593-94.
In the federal courts, however, the modern trend has been toward a liberalization of
the conditions which must be met before mandamus will be granted. The authority to
issue writs of mandamus is generally grounded upon the All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651(a) (1970): "[A]ll courts established by . . . Congress may issue all writs necessary
or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions.
... Modem interpretation of
what constitutes appellate jurisdiction for the purposes of the All Writs Statute has
establishe[dI that [it] is not determined by the circumstance of an actual pendency of an appeal . . . but solely by the dispositive factor whether the proceeding in the lower court which is sought to be affected by the writ of mandamus
or prohibition is ultimately reviewable by the appellate court.
Green v. Murphy, supra at 598 (Kalodner, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original); accord,
La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 255 (1957); Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n,
supra at 25; cf. Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 246 (1932). Consequently, a court
of appeals has power to issue the writs, whenever appropriate, in cases within its jurisdiction. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, supra at 25.
Further broadening of the scope of mandamus powers has occurred because of the
higher courts' willingness to use mandamus as a tool to effectuate their supervisory
powers. For example, in Howes Leather Co. v. La Buy, 226 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1955),
aff'd, 352 U.S. 249 (1957), the Seventh Circuit granted mandamus in a case in which it
believed that the trial judge, in exercising a legitimate discretion, had made a decision
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sider such use appropriate. 8 0 Yet there is general confusion as to what
requirements must be met before mandamus will lie. Few courts of
appeals have actually granted mandamus in such a case, typically finding that their prerequisites for issuance of the writ are not satisfied. 8 1
Those circuits which refuse mandamus review in disqualification cases
rely on its traditional use as an extraordinary remedy, confined to
situations wherein final appeal will be unavailable or inadequate and
the trial judge has totally exceeded any legitimate jurisdiction he or
she had in the case. 82
An excellent example of the quandary in which the courts of appeals find themselves regarding mandamus is the Third Circuit case
of Green v. Murphy.8 3 In Green, a mandamus petition requesting the
so outrageous as to be "an abuse of discretion," and thus not allowable even within
"the permissive scope of the rule" involved. 226 F.2d at 707, 711. In affirming this
decision, the Supreme Court adopted the same rationale. See 352 U.S. at 255-56.
The La Buy decisions by both the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court have
been severely criticized by Charles Alan Wright, who termed their "potential consequences" as "truly breathtaking." Wright, supra at 775. Professor Wright indicated that
even if Judge La Buy's order referring the case to a master was not justified, it should
have been reviewed only after a final judgment, not on a petition for mandamus. Id. at
772-74. Wright personally opposed any erosion of the traditional prohibition of piecemeal appeals. However, he felt that if such a development were to occur, it should be
"by way of legislation or court rule," and not "through a device so unclear and so unconfined as judicial liberalization of ... mandamus and prohibition." Id. at 777-78.
80 See In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927
(1961); Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1966); General Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Watkins, 363 F.2d 87 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966) (propriety assumed but
not discussed); Henry v. Speer, 201 F. 869 (5th Cir. 1913) (propriety assumed but not
discnssed); Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co. v. Nlolyneaox, 70 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1934);
Gladstein v. McLaughlin, 230 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1955); United States v. Ritter, 273 F.2d
30 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 950 (1960); Hurd v. Letts, 152 F.2d 121 (D.C.
Cir. 1945). For cases denying the propriety of using mandamus to review denial of a
disqualification motion see Green v. lurphy, 259 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1958) (concurring
and dissenting opinions endorse pro-mandalus position); Albert v. United States Dist.
Ct., 283 F.2d 61 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 828 (1961); Korer v. Hoffinan, 212
F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1954).
81 Only the Ninth and Tenth Circuits appear to have gone beyond merely endorsing
the use of mandamus in disqualification cases and actually issued the writ. Connelly v.
United States Dist. Ct., 191 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1951); In re Honolulu Consol. Oil Co.,
243 F. 348 (9th Cir. 1917); United Family Life Ins. Co. v. Barrow, 452 F.'2d 997 (10th
Cir. 1971); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Chandler, 303 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 915 (1963); United States v. Ritter, 273 F.2d 30, 32 (10th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 950 (1960).
82 Green v. lurphy, 259 F.2d 591, 593-94 (3d Cir. 1958); Korer v. Hoffman, 212
F.2d 211, 213-14 (7th Cir. 1954). In Albert v. United States Dist. Ct., 283 F.2d 61 (6th
Cir. 1960), the court stated that to be reviewable by mandamus, the judge's duties must
be "ministerial, plainly defined and peremptory," and that it must be "clear and undisputable that there is no other legal remedy." Id. at 62.
83 259 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1958).
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court of appeals to order Judge Murphy's disqualification was denied
en banc, with two judges concurring and one dissenting.8 4 The basis
of the motion in this case was fairly unusual. The defendant, a longtime political and social intimate of the judge, feared that Judge
Murphy, because of his desire to show that friendship would not affect his impartiality, would favor the prosecution. 8 5 In declining to
issue the writ the majority made several statements which may be
viewed as the basis for its holding: (1) there was an adequate remedy
by appeal in the case; (2) the writs might "be issued only in aid of
[the] court's appellate jurisdiction"; (3) these extraordinary remedies
were justified "only when rare and exceptional circumstances [were]
present"; and (4) no special circumstances existed in the case warranting issuance of the writ. s6
The precise meaning of Green is difficult to determine, as the
conflicting interpretations by the concurring and dissenting judges
well illustrate. Judge Hastie's concurring opinion emphasized the lack
of extraordinary circumstances as the reason for the decision, stating
that the majority would have allowed mandamus where a judge was
"arbitrarily or scandalously disregarding his plain duty to disqualify
87
himself. . . but that such circumstances do not appear in this case."This reading of the opinion seems fallacious since, as pointed out by
Judge Kalodner in his dissent, the majority specifically stated that it
was not even considering the affidavit in reaching its decision, 8 8 and
could not, therefore, have decided whether these were special circumstances. Judge Kalodner's view, that the majority's holding was
based "on the specific absence of 'appellate jurisdiction,' "89 seems
more correct. Thus, the implication of the holding is that the remedy
by appeal is adequate in any disqualification case because the judge's
strictly legal decision may be reviewed on appeal. 90 Consequently, it
may be inferred from the majority opinion that courts of appeals lack

14Id. at 594,

595 (Hastie, J., concurring), 596 (Kalodner, J., dissenting).

85 Id. at 593, 595 (Hastie, J., concurring), 596-97 (Kalodner, J., dissenting).

861d. at 594. Chief Judge Biggs considered the remedy of appeal to be adequate
because the court would be able to overturn an adverse judgment on appeal if it found
that the trial judge should have disqualified himself. Id. No direct explanation was
given of the aid of jurisdiction requirement. See id. Judge Biggs did state, however, that
the desire to avoid an entire trial which would be reversed if the judge's denial of the
motion were found to be erroneous was not an extraordinary circumstance. Nor would a
wrongful refusal to disqualify constitute an abuse of the trial court's power warranting
mandamus, since the court did have jurisdiction to make the decision. Id.
87 Id. at 595.
88 Id. at 594, 603.
89Id. at 603.
90 See id. at 593-94.
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appellate jurisdiction to review denial of a disqualification motion by
mandamus. 9 1 In addition, the majority also relied on the fact that the
trial judge does have jurisdiction to pass on the affidavit-rightly or
wrongly; 92 hence, the function of mandamus-to confine a judge to3
9
the exercise of his or her legitimate powers-is not called into play.
Judge Hastie, concurring, agreed that the petition in this case
should be denied, since he felt that "possible psychological overcompensation for an inclination favorable to a party" did not constitute
the type of bias required by section 144. 94 However, he did feel that
mandamus was an appropriate method of review, and that the disqualification question should be decided on the merits of the
affidavits. 95 He also indicated that it might be best under these circumstances if the judge voluntarily "stepp[ed] aside" in order to
maintain the appearance of justice. 9 6 The dissenting opinion shared
the legal conclusion that mandamus does lie to review a refusal to
disqualify. 97 Judge Kalodner differed only in that he felt that the particular facts clearly warranted the issuance of mandamus. 98
The different Green opinions are illustrative of the positions taken,
and the problems encountered, by other circuits. For example, the
First Circuit, in deciding In re Union Leader Corp. ,99 has adopted
the view of the concurring opinion in Green that all disqualification
cases pose an extraordinary situation because of "the right to be tried
before an unbiased judge."' 10 0 On the other hand, the Sixth and
91 See id. (semble).

921d. at 593.
93 See id. at 594.
94
Id. at 595.

95 d.
96 Id. at 595-96.

97id. at 597-602 (Kalodner, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 596-97, 602-05.
99292 F.2d 381 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961).
100 See 292 F.2d at 384. The petition was denied, however, since the movant,

wxho

had suffered an adverse verdict, deliberately published articles denigrating the judge's
ethics. Id. at 387.
Where the movant's own calculated behavior is the basis of the charge of prejudice,
a finding that the affidavit does not allege facts sufficient to require disqualification is
clearly warranted, since it would be an outrage to permit parties to successfully engage
in such bad faith practices. But even when no bad faith is apparent, mandamus is still
denied on the grounds of the legal insufficiency of the affidavit or the absence of extraordinary circumstances. See, e.g., Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co. v. Nlolyneaux, 70 F.2d
545 (8th Cir. 1934), in which the court held that a receivership proceeding was not
inherently an exceptional case. Id. at 547. In addition, the court ruled that even if it
were a special situation, the affidavit was insufficient because of untimely filing and
failure to adequately state facts warranting disqualification. Id. No specific references to
the affidavit were made to indicate which portions were deficient.
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Seventh Circuits share the conviction of the Green majority that
mandamus is not an appropriate remedy for denial of a disqualification motion. 10 1 A third viewpoint is presented by the Ninth Circuit
cases. In Gladstein v. McLaughlin,' 0 2 that circuit endorsed a different
interpretation of the extraordinary circumstances requirement for
mandamus in disqualification cases, i.e., that the nature of the harm
which may arise out of the particular case may warrant granting the
writ.1 0 3 Finally, a number of courts seem to treat the petition as an appeal, looking to whether the trial judge's decision as to legal sufficiency
04
was correct. 1

In Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Chandler, 303 F.2d 55, 56-57 (10th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 915 (1963), the trial judge was removed from the case because of
improper actions in bankruptcy proceedings. That court emphasized that the judge's
alleged actions clearly demonstrated bias and that failure to remove him would result in
denial of a fair trial. Authority to grant relief in a disqualification case was premised on
United States v. Ritter, 273 F.2d 30, 32 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 950
(1960), which stated that regardless of the source of the power, the court had the " 'inescapable duty . . . to effectuate what seems . . . to be the manifest ends of justice.' "
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Chandler, supra at 56-57. Thus, disqualification itself
appears to be an extraordinary situation in the opinion of the Tenth Circuit.
101 See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
102 230 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1955).
103 See id. at 763-64. The Gladstein court was ready to grant the writ because of the
possibility of irreparable harm to attorney Gladstein's reputation pending the outcome
of a disbarment proceeding initiated against him in the District of Hawaii by Judge
McLaughlin. Gladstein was representing Communist defendants in various federal district courts, and Judge McLaughlin, J fervent anti-Communist, sought his disbarment
after Cladstein had been jailed for contempt in New York. Id. The writ was not issued,
however, since the court preferred to rely on the judge's integrity in following its unofficial mandate, Id. at 764. But see United States v. Ritter, 273 F.2d 30, 32 (10th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 950 (1960), in which the trial judge had refused to comply
with such a suggestion, and the court of appeals was then forced to issue the writ.
In two other Ninth Circuit cases the writ was actually granted, although the court's
jurisdiction to issue the writ was not discussed. See Connelly v. United States Dist. Ct.,
191 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1951) (based on strong anti-Communist bias of judge, with this
the trial of a Communist); In re Honolulu Consol. Oil Co., 243 F. 348 (9th Cir. 1917)
(based on judge's former, minor stock ownership in a corporate party).
judge stated in a footnote that the propriety of mandamus or prohibition had not been
challenged. He indicated that he believed it was appropriate. Id. at 693 n.1. But see
230 F.2d at 764 (Pope, J., concurring) (expressing view that footnote "misconstrued the
language of" Berger).
Other circuits appear to apply an analysis similar to that of the Gladstein court. See,
e.g., Hurd v. Letts, 152 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (recusal question should be
"reserved for appeal . . . unless there are special circumstances" (citation omitted)); In
re Lisman, 89 F.2d 898, 899 (2d Cir. 1937) (per curiam) (even where appeal possible,
original writs available "where special circumstances exist"); Minnesota & Ontario
Paper Co. v. Molyneaux, 70 F.2d 545, 547 (8th Cir. 1934) (appeal of recusal denial
available, but a writ may issue in "a 'rare and exceptional' case").
104 See, e.g., Foster v. Medina, 170 F.2d 632, 633-34 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 909 (1949); Henry v. Speer, 201 F. 869, 872 (5th Cir. 1913).
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Thus, it is apparent that when a disqualification motion is denied, the movant has no clear avenue by which to take his fears to an
appellate court and avoid the problems of an unsatisfactory trial situation. Final appeal comes too late in most cases; attempts to secure an
interlocutory appeal rarely succeed; and mandamus is generally denied. Combined with the difficulties at the trial level, these problems
highlight the need for a different system which can better protect
litigants who fear a judge to be biased.
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Many authors have addressed the problems in the disqualification system and have endorsed particular remedies for its amelioration. What will be helpful at this point is an overview of these
proposals, combining the most useful of them with some new suggestions, toward the end of improving the system as a whole.
One method of disqualification reform which is discussed frequently is the peremptory challenge. 10 5 Under such a system, the
filing of an affidavit would require the judge's disqualification, much
10 6
in the same way a peremptory challenge would disqualify a juror.
As this was arguably the original intent of section 144, although never
implemented, the statute would have to be amended to clearly pro07
vide for an automatic disqualification upon filing of a motion.'
Opponents of this system advance many objections to it. Some
feel that it vests litigants with too much power in the selection of a
judge to sit on a particular case, possibly resulting in many situations
08
in which no judge in the district would be able to hear a case.'
Another objection is that judges would be deprived of work. 109 There
105See, e.g., Frank, supra note 1, at 65-67; Schwartz, supra note 4, at 427; Com-

ment, supra note 26.
Some states, e.g., Oregon and California, are currently utilizing a peremptory disqualification procedure. For an extremely thorough discussion of Oregon's experience,
as well as a survey of the systems in use in all of the states, see Symposium, supra note
1, at 332-400. See also Note, supra note 1, at 1437-38.
106 Frank, supra note 1, at 6,5-66.
107 See note 4 su pra and accompanying text.
108See, e.g., Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1050 (5th Cir. 1975),
wherein the court expressed the concern that
[r]ead broadly, this peremptory challenge type approach would bid fair to decimate the bench. Lawyers, once in controversy with a judge, would have a
license under which the judge would serve at their will.
See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 426.
109 Cf. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 426. The author also discussed the possible burden which a peremptory challenge system might impose on the courts, especially in
those districts having only one judge. Id.
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is also great apprehension that a peremptory system would be used as
a dilatory tactic by disingenuous litigants. 110
All of these concerns are certainly valid, but they are easily rebutted. A party who challenges a judge will not have a choice as to
his or her replacement. This system, therefore, does not permit unwarranted exercise of control by litigants in choosing a judge. Since
most districts today have more than one judge, and since rapid transportation makes the services of other judges much more readily available than in earlier times, it would be quite rare that peremptory
disqualification of a judge leaves no other judge in the district to try
the case. 1 ' With the backlog of cases in most courts today, any judge
who is disqualified from a case will have more than enough other
cases waiting to be tried. Those who fear delay under this system
overlook the safeguards against potential abuse. Proponents of peremptory challenge generally suggest that only one be available per
side."X2 However, this would not hamper those seeking to disqualify a
second judge, since there is no limit to the number of motions that
11 3
can be filed under section 455's grounds for disqualification.
Moreover, the factor with the greatest potential for preventing abuse
4
of the peremptory system is the requirement of timely filing."1
Use of the peremptory challenge would have to be strictly limited to the earliest stages of a proceeding. Thus, it should always be
available where the case has merely been assigned to a judge who has
taken no action therein. Past that point an appropriate cut-off time
110It has been suggested that in the criminal context such delay might result in " 'a
substantial denial of justice.' " Id. (quoting from 46 CONG. REC. 2627 (1911) (remarks of
Representative Bennett opposing the predecessor bill to section 144)).
"I Comment, Disqualification for Interest of Lower Federal Court Judges: 28
U.S.C. § 455, 71 MICH. L. REV. 538, 565 (1973). This author pointed out that many years
ago

there were no multijudge districts, only limited provision for the use of visiting
judges, and poor communication and transportation systems. Consequently, if
one judge could not hear a case a considerable delay might ensue before
another judge could be obtained to hear it.
Id. (footnote omitted). Since these conditions no longer exist, replacing a disqualified
judge is generally a simple and rapid procedure. Id. See Note, supra note 12, at 747-48.
112See, e.g., S. 1886, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 4201, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970). These identical bills were introduced by Senator Birch Bayh as proposed
amendments to existing disqualification statutes. If passed, these bills would have allowed "one peremptory challenge" by any party and "only one affidavit" per side. See
also Frank, supra note 1, at 65-66; Comment, supra note 26, at 135-36. But see ORE.
REV. STAT. § 14.260 (1963) (two challenges per party).
113 See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (Supp. IV, 1975).
114 Timely filing is already required under section 144; however, as presently
worded the standard has little meaning. See note 14 supra.
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would best be determined by the judiciary themselves, taking into
account the pretrial complexity of different types of cases. 1 15 It would
seem most desirable for such standards to be established for the
whole federal court system by the Supreme Court in its supervisory
capacity, aided by the input of the Judicial Conference of the United
States. 116 Such a cut-off point should probably be expressed in terms
of a maximum period which will be allowed for filing the motion after
the bias is perceived, but with a terminal point in the proceedings
after which it will never be permitted. 117 Once this early stage of the
proceedings has passed and the judge has invested considerable time
on the case, peremptory challenges should no longer be permitted."'
A peremptory system has many advantages. It avoids any discussion
of whether the judge actually is or even appears to be biased; it is
merely the expression by the movant of a preference that another
judge try the case. 119 Such a method is protective of judges' reputations, since no finding of the sufficiency of the allegations need be
made.' 2 0 Nor would it be damaging to the courts, since under this
" See notes 42-45 supra and accompanying

text. If the procedures were estab-

lished by the judiciary, great flexibility could be provided for accommodating considerations of local practice. See Symposium, supra note 1, at 402.
116

Such an approach was suggested in Comment, supra note 111, at 567-68. Since

the members of the judiciary have been part of the system as both judges and lawyers,
they seem to be in the best position to balance the considerations on both sides of the
question.
117 Such a system would disable those who wait for a number of routine rulings to

be made merely to see whether things are going in their favor. See, e.g., Symposium,
supra note 1, at 403. This would also acknowledge that a reasonable amount of time is
needed after the intial perception of bias to perhaps investigate further and prepare a
proper affidavit. It would take into account as well that there are both routine and extraordinary factors which may arise in an attorney's schedule which prevent immediate
filing of an affidavit. Current narrow interpretation of section 14 4's timely filing requirement has resulted in some arbitrary rulings. For example, in Eisler v. United
States, 170 F.2d 273, 277-78 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. dismissed, 338 U.S. 883 (1949), a
nine-day lapse between the movant's learning the judge's identity and filing of the affidavit was held to be untimely, even though the chief attorney's brother had died in the
interim. The court found such reason unpersuasive, pointing out that two other counsel
were of record.
118 Ruling on pretrial motions and overseeing depositions and discovery may well

involve extensive involvement by the judge. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532,
541-42 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken,
Inc., 400 F. Supp. 497, 502, 505 (D.S.C. 1975).
119 Frank, supra note 1, at 65-66.
120 The Bayh bills, discussed at note 112 supra, would require no explanation for

the movant's belief that the judge is biased. While the Bayh proposal would be beneficial by eliminating judicial testing of the legal sufficiency of the allegations of prejudice, it does not go far enough in the peremptory challenge context. Judges often oppose liberal recusal systems because of their fear that granting the motion will be a
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method disqualification would be basically an administrative matter.
Moreover, there is no legitimate basis for objection by the opposing
party-except perhaps in one-judge districts-since neither side has a
12 1
"right" to have a particular judge try the case.
Besides adoption of a peremptory challenge provision, other reforms are needed. We have seen that the current system is fraught
with difficulties, because in most districts it is the challenged judge
who rules on the motion.12 2 A solution which has often been suggested is that a different judge make this ruling.12 3 It has alternatively been proposed that the affidavit be submitted to another dis25
trict judge' 2 4 or to the court of appeals.1
For the greatest protection of the litigant, and to create a more
cooperative trial atmosphere should the motion be denied, it would
seem most effective for the ruling to be made by a three-judge panel.
If three judges have ruled on the sufficiency of the affidavit, it would
be much more reasonable to require the movant to wait for final appeal to assign the ruling as error. 126 Thus, the affidavit could initially
be submitted to the challenged judge. If he or she decided to step
reflection on their competence. Since the Bayh bill would require the peremptory motion to be phrased in terms of prejudice, and no scrutiny would be made of this bare
allegation, this concern would remain. A better approach would be to merely require a
statement that the movant desires to have a different judge without any mention of
prejudice. This would liberalize the system considerably by allowing requests for a new
judge for any reason whatsoever. See Frank, supra note 1, at 67.
121See note 41 supra. Moreover, the judge "has no vested right to sit in [a
particular] case." Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 814 (3d Cir. 1965); Note, supra
note 1, at 1437.
In any system that is adopted, special provisions could be made for districts having
only one judge, including stricter standards or a balancing of the amount of delay
against the degree of prejudice. In addition, there are currently only ten districts having
one judge with no additional roving judge. 401 F. Supp. at VII-XXI.
122 See notes 29-35 supra and accompanying text. But see, e.g., Craven v. United
States, 22 F.2d 605, 607 (st Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 276 U.S. 627 (1928) ("presiding
judge, under a fitting and common practice, referred the sufficiency of [the] affidavit to
another District Judge").
123 One commentator has observed that referral of the affidavit to a different judge
would be "[a] remedy not quite as drastic as the automatic disqualification procedure."
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 429. Another author has pointed out that "if there is real prejudice, another judge is less likely to err and unnecessary litigation may be avoided." 13
CORNELL L.Q. 454, 458 (1928); see also Note, supra note 11, at 251.
124 Note, supra note 1, at 1439.
125Id. at 1439, 1441.
126 Under such a system the ruling to be made would be the same as it is now: Are
the allegations in the affidavit a sufficient indication of bias to require the judge's disqualification? In order to make this determination, these judges would need only the
affidavit itself and a knowledge of pertinent disqualification law. No evidence or testimony would need to be reviewed. Thus, a prompt ruling would be possible.
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aside, no further action would be necessary. 12 7 Should the motion be
denied, however, it would then be sent on to the three-judge panel,
not to review the challenged judge's ruling, but merely to make an
independent finding as to the legal sufficiency of the affidavit. The
decision to be made would be whether the allegations in the affidavit
reasonably support a belief that the judge is biased.' 28 If the panel
denies the motion as well, the litigant should feel comforted by the
fact that the motion has received impartial consideration by three
judges other than the challenged one. The challenged judge should
be less likely to harbor hostility toward the movant in conducting the
ensuing trial, since the denial of the motion by the panel can be seen
as vindicating his or her impartiality.
The decision of who should comprise this panel is crucial to effective reform. It seems best that it not be composed of district court
1 29
If
judges, since they would be passing upon one of their peers.
three court of appeals judges made the determination, this problem
would be diminished. There might still be difficulties with this composition of the panel, however, since appellate judges are likely to be
quite familiar with many of the district judges in their circuits and the
cases those judges are hearing. One way to counteract this difficulty
would be to have the affidavits drawn up giving the allegations in a
hypothetical form, without giving the names of the judge or parties
involved. If this method were used, the personal aspect of the ruling
0
might be alleviated. 13
Another possibility would be to have a panel of retired judges in
each circuit available to rule on disqualification affidavits. Each affidavit could be mailed to three members of this panel, on a rotating
basis, who would consider it and return their votes to be compiled by

127 An initial ruling by the challenged judge would conserve judicial time and effort, facilitating an immediate resolution in cases where the judge agrees that bias is
apparent from the allegations. This ruling should simply be a grant or denial of the
motion without written opinion, hearings, or fact-finding. Strict time limits should be set
within which the ruling must be made.
128 This approach incorporates the appearance-of-bias standard discussed at notes
24-28 supra and accompanying text.
129 It has been noted that even though referral to a different district judge
would be an improvement over the present system, a district judge passing on
the disqualification of one of his colleagues would be in a sensitive position,
and ... might feel under pressure not to disqualify.
Note, supra note 1, at 1439; see Comment, supra note 26, at 141 n.148.
130 This system would not be foolproof either. Since many cases in which disqualification motions are filed may be notorious in the district, the description of certain
facts might not permit sufficient anonymity even where names are omitted.
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the chief judge.' 3 ' The imposition upon these retired jurists would
seem to be minimal: The number of motions filed subject to this system would not be great;' 3 2 the test of legal sufficiency would be on
the face of the affidavit and would not require review of the record;
and, this task could be performed in their own homes.
Regardless of who is passing on the motion, the use of clearer
standards is necessary. Under the amended section 455, the standards
are very definite for certain types of interest. Thus, even if the judge
does not determine sua sponte that disqualification is required, he or
she will surely step aside when a direct financial interest or close
familial relationship with a party is alleged.' 3 3 But for the more
nebulous sorts of bias, review by three disinterested judges may not
be adequate reform if old case law definitions of sufficiency continue
to be applied.' 3 4 Here, too, it would be best for the Supreme Court
to promulgate guidelines for judging the sufficiency of "personal" bias
or prejudice alleged in an affidavit. The emphasis should be on the
reasonableness of the movant's belief that the judge is biased, not on
the source or nature of the bias. If this appearance-of-bias standard
were emphasized by the Supreme Court as a guiding principle for the
lower courts, this alone would do much towards improving our federal disqualification system.
Of course, there are those who fear abuse of a more lenient sys131 After compiling the results, the chief judge would issue an order in accordance
with the majority vote and would assign a new judge if disqualification is ordered.
132 It is interesting to note at this point that there do not appear to be any records
kept by the federal district courts or the Administrator of the United States Courts regarding disqualification motions. The only federal recusal statistics which this author
was able to find are those in Comment, supra note 111, at 568-70. The author of that
Comment wrote to the chief judges of all the federal district courts, asking for responses
to six questions on the use of section 455 in their districts. Id. It seems likely, however,
that their answers are applicable as well to motions under section 144, since motions
under the two statutes are often joined. Although the number of disqualifications per
judge per year varied among the districts, the average number was three and one-half,
and the median two. Id. at 569. Out of forty-two districts responding, twenty-seven indicated that all disqualifications under section 455 "were on the judges' own motions."
Id. If self-disqualification under section 455 is prevalent in such a large percentage of
districts, it is probable that the number of motions which are filed under section 144 will
not be large.
133 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(b)(4), (5) (Supp. IV, 1975). For text of section 455 see note 7
supra. Disqualification is also required when the judge, either in private practice or as
a government attorney, has been directly related to the matter in suit as a material witness or as a lawyer. 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(b)(2), (3) (Supp. IV, 1975).
134 Sections (a) and (b)(1) of section 455 still fail to give guidelines as to what might
lead to reasonable questioning of the judge's impartiality or what might constitute "personal bias or prejudice" sufficient to require disqualification. For text of section 455
see note 7 supra.
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tem. It must be recognized, however, that many other devices are
available to those who wish to harass their opponents or impose upon
the court system. Disqualification motions are only one weapon in
this arsenal of delay. In addition, sanctions are available against parties and attorneys who file motions in bad faith, and it would seem
only fair that any proposal which suggests a more liberal procedure
for motions emphasize that those who abuse the system be strictly
penalized. Since the motion must be certified by counsel, the charge
1 35
of perjury is available when an affidavit seems clearly false.
Another remedy for the judge who feels that the movant has unconscionably distorted his or her remarks or actions is a contempt
citation. 136 Moreover, independent disciplinary action may be taken
against the attorney. 137 All of these methods should be used by
judges when they sense ill motive on the part of the movant, rather
than adopting a blanket hard-line attitude against all movants, regardless of their sincerity. 138

One last problem to be addressed in this proposed scheme for
disqualification reform is the motion brought after trial has commenced. The probable length of trial is a major factor to be considered in deciding whether the movant will be seriously prejudiced by
having to wait for final judgment or whether the motion should be
135 Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 35 (1921). Justice McKenna also pointed
out that if an attorney is a party to the perjury, disbarment may result. Id. Certainly, a
lesser form of disciplinary action would be available.
136 Orfield, Recusation of Judges in Federal Courts, 17 BUFFALO L. REV. 799, 808
(1968). Professor Orfield stated:
An affidavit obviously malicious and scandalous toward the judge may constitute contempt of court. Similarly, an attorney wvho certifies to the good faith
of [such] an affidavit . .. nay be prosecuted for contempt. Also, filing a belated
affidavit against a judge before whom matters in litigation are pending undecided may be contempt of court as constituting an improper effort to influence a
judicial decision.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
137 Various sections of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility/provide a basis

for the discipline of lawyers who knowingly file frivolous or harassing affidavits. The
preliminary statement to the code indicates that "[t]he Disciplinary Rules state the
minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to
disciplinary action." While not itself prescribing penalties for violations, the Code recommends punishment commensurate with "the character of the offense and the attendant circumstances.- Thus, any' range of penalties ss'ould he available for bad faith use
of disqualification motions under a number of Disciplinary Rules. See, e.g., ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102; DR 7-102(A)(1), (4), (5), (7), (8); DR
7-106(C)(6), (7).
138Even if the judge does not feel bad faith is involved, but merely wishes to state
his or her view as to the matters alleged in the affidavit, it is always possible to insert

an explanation into the record. Note, supra note 1, at 1437.
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immediately reviewed pursuant to the above-described proposal. In a
case lasting no longer than a few days, the desire to avoid delay may
outweigh any detriment to the litigant. Hence, when a litigant develops a fear that the judge is biased on the second or third day of a
probable four- or five-day trial, it does not seem unreasonable to insist that the proceedings be completed prior to review.
In cases which are likely to extend for a long period of time, it is
more reasonable to demand immediate review of the disqualification
motion by the disinterested panel. Especially in those cases which are
tried before a judge without a jury, the prejudice engendered by a
continuance will not be substantial. Even in cases tried before a jury,
the considerable degree of time and expense which will be consumed
by the trial militates against requiring litigants to engage in efforts
which will be futile should the judge be disqualified on subsequent
appeal. 1 39 The decision as to whether the trial will be lengthy enough
to warrant its disruption for immediate review of the disqualification
motion should be left to the discretion of the trial judge. However,
guidelines should be furnished by the Supreme Court to enable the
trial judge to make a reasonable, non-arbitrary decision.
CONCLUSION

As we have seen, disqualifying a judge is a nearly impossible
task. Judges are subject to the same human foibles as the rest of us,
hence they dislike being challehged regarding the most basic qualification for their position-their impartiality. For this reason, the author has suggested a new disqualification mechanism having the principal goal of putting the disqualification motion in a more impersonal
light.
To this end, a universal system of peremptory challenge should
be adopted for the earliest stages of the proceeding, within a time
139 It seems ironic for judges to complain about crowded court calendars while also

stating that the inconvenience of a lengthy and wasted trial is insufficient reason for
permitting appellate review before final judgment. Compare General Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Watkins, 331 F.2d 192, 198 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 952 (1964) with Roche v.
Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1943).
Professor Rosenberg has observed that
[w]hatever reasons there are for non-reviewability of wrong trial court decisions, shortage of judicial machinery is apparently not a significant one. We
have plenty of appellate courts, waiting . . . for mistaken calls by trial judges.
Their whole reason for existence it might be argued, is to reverse erroneous
decisions by lower courts. Why should they abstain from their duty?
Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Cou rt, Viewed From Above, 22 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 635, 645 (1971).
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limit designated by the Supreme Court in its supervisory power.
Only after such time would a motion be subject to a finding of legal
sufficiency by the trial judge. Should the motion be denied, the affidavit should be immediately forwarded to the proposed three-judge
panel, except in those cases in which the trial jtqdge, in his or her
discretion, and subject to Supreme Court guidelines, determines that
the trial will be too short to warrant use of this procedure. Moreover,
such a system must have as its linchpin a firm commitment by courts
at all levels that the appearance-of-bias standard will be applied. Not
only would the foregoing system have the advantage of making disqualification more impersonal, but it would eliminate the problems
present in waiting for review of the motion until the close of a
lengthy case. In addition, this system would avoid the problems
which surround the use of mandamus and other interlocutory review
procedures, thus giving more security to the litigant and to counsel.
Helena Kempner Kobrin

